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“ALL THAT HAS BECOME PART OF US NOW” 
BETWEEN MOTHER TONGUE  
AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE 
Jean-Marie Prieur 
Université Paul Valéry – Montpellier III 




Résumé  Articulé en trois temps sur les concepts Lacaniens de Réel, Symbolique et Imaginaire, 
l’article dégage successivement, à travers des références aux travaux d’Andrée Tabouret-Keller 
et des exemples pris chez quelques écrivains majeurs du XXe siècle confrontés au 
plurilinguisme, plusieurs notions capitales, notamment celles de contrainte, d’institution et 
d’identification, dont se constitue toute langue pour tout sujet. 
 




We all commonly use the expression “mother tongue” as though it could 
be taken for granted and as though its meaning were obvious. Its basis seems so 
solid that it is pointless to question it or even cast doubt on  its “necessity”. 
And yet this necessity has the deceptiveness of the patently obvious. 
Some scholarly research, especially that of Andrée Tabouret-Keller 
(2003, 21/ 2004, 277), has traced the historical roots of this expression back to 
its first occurrences in 12
th 
century Church texts, where it is used to distinguish 
the vernacular from the scholarly languages. This research has brought to light 




“metaphoric crossroads” whose actualization depends on the historical and 
social contexts in which it is used. 
 
Regardless of languages, era, and ideological and political discourses, 
the usages of the expression are based upon “very diverse representations” such 
as the flesh and blood mother, birth, blood, lineage, clan, foundation, orality, 
territory, community, people… Our perspective however is not to delimit the 
many usages of the expression but to put forward two propositions: 
What is described as “mother” tongue does not correspond to any particular linguistic 
object, an object which derives its particularity from a “maternal” attribute, even though 
J. Lacan is reported to have said that the “mother tongue” is a “fantasy” elaborated by 
linguists and grammarians about the “dispersion” and “hybridation” of languages. 
For each and every one of us, “there is” language, even if we should 
think this “there is”, as contemporary sociolinguistics (Canut, 2005; Gadet, 
2006) invites us to do, against the background of linguistic multiplicity and 
heterogeneity or of permanent and indefinite fluctuation of “usages”. This 
“there is language” implies that there are for each one of us, for each subject, 
three dimensions inextricably knotted together and to language:  the Real, the 
Symbolic and the Imaginary. 
R for Real 
The notion of “real” refers to the phonetic, vocal and corporal materiality 
of languages and to the “order of constraints” (Tabouret-Keller 1990, 11) that 
they impose on their speakers. “My voice comes out of my body”, writes 
Flaubert, “but my body is in my voice”. The vocal event is governed by a first 
order of constraint: the voice is materially rooted in the body, speech1 is 
physical and at the same time it must submit to what Saussure (1968, 103) calls 
“the linear character of the signifier”, meaning that vocality forces speech to 
unfold along a “line”, i.e. all utterances occur in time and are perceived by the 
ear as a sequence. 
Even before they are symbolic and semantic systems or universes, languages 
are modes of being and of corporal and vocal presence, heterogeneous to one 
another. With Saussure, linguistics has shed light on some minimal and 
constitutive properties of this “order of the real”, properties which also define 
natural languages: arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, double articulation of the 
units of language, their differential character and their “co-functionality” as a 
system. 
                                                     
1 “Speech” translates the French word “parole” from the Saussurean triad: “langage, langue, parole”.  
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J.-Cl. Milner (2002, 15) clearly expresses our debt to what he calls “the 
structural journey”
 
when he shows how, being completely at odds with the 
philosophical tradition, Saussure’s notion of difference opens up a previously 
unheard-of way of thinking unity and identity, a unity cut through by 
multiplicities, no longer a unity strictly speaking but rather a network of 
intersecting multiple determinations. 
Languages as “linguistic systems” represent a second order of constraints: 
they impose on the speaker their “systematic singularity”, that is a number of 
forms, structures, syntactic constraints, morphological conventions. This is 
what Saussure called the “game of the forced card” (1968, 104): we may feel 
that we are free to choose but language forces us to go through its twists and 
turns, its signs, its forms, its structures. 
To be confronted with the systematic singularity of a given language is 
to be confronted with constraints that we cannot imagine; these constraints 
determine an “impossibility”, the impossibility to say something that would be 
outside the limits imposed by that singularity. It is with this “real” that linguistics 
and grammar are confronted in order to build a “representation” (Milner 1978, 
113) of it, to bring out the “properties” which make its representation possible: 
regularities, constants, recurrences. The same properties which make language 
teachable but also the locus and basis of any transmission.  
In De Vulgari eloquentia, Dante (1965, 568) describes the constitutive 
knotting of “grammar” and  the “scholarly tradition”: 
It is the kind of thinking that moved the creators of grammatical art.. In fact, grammar is 
nothing else but a certain identity of language which is not altered by either time or place 
… Thus they created it so that the fluctuations of language according to everyone’s fancy 
would not prevent us from understanding philosophical texts and the tales of ancient 
gests. 
S for Symbolic  
According to psychoanalysis, subjectivity and language are “knotted” together 
mainly through the modality of institution; institution meaning that speech is, 
through language, the distinctive mode of existence of the human species. It is 
to this that the widely known neologism forged by Lacan, “parlêtres”, refers. 
Indeed life, in order to be human, has to go through a process of 
institution. Each subject is initiated into this process by a founding speech, an 
“originary” speech, which inscribes him/her in the order of generations, confers 
on him/her a name, a “symbolic place” (Tabouret-Keller 2000a, 59/ 2000b, 75) 
which integrates him/her in networks of kinship and alliance. Throughout life 
and its avatars we are always represented only by words, i.e. we only exist 
inasmuch as we speak, through the language we speak which provides us with 
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the terms and expressions which in turn represent us in our relations to other 
subjects and to ourselves; our very names and diverse identities come to life in 
this language and because of it. And thus we can say, quoting one of Lacan’s 
jokes, that man is made up of signs more than he makes out. 
The signifier is not only that which brings out what is not there; what is not there, the 
signifier does not refer to it, it generates it; but then what is not there at the origin itself is 
the subject. (Lacan, 1966b). 
If the signifier generates the subject, if it is the “cause” of the subject, 
this means radically that the symbolic order, and language as “symbolic order”, 
“organized system of symbols”, are grounded neither in nature, nor “in the 
subject”; rather it is nature and the subject which are grounded in the symbolic 
order which, in its structure and its effects, eludes the subject. Here subjects are 
not only determined by signifiers which sustain the desire of their parents, but 
they “fall” from the relation to this embodied Other, to the Other as principle of 
institutionalization, as seat of the signifier, site of prohibition (l’interdit) and of 
the categories of kinship. 
It follows that our relationship to language is not simply one of acquisition 
or appropriation, but one of institution, of “symbolic inscription”. Our name is 
the first operation of this relationship; through being named we are counted as 
“one” and incribed symbolically in a “system of places”. The most radical form 
of this naming function is the inscription, the epitaph on the tombstone. 
Tabouret-Keller quotes “That Mighty Sculptor, Time” by Marguerite 
Yourcenar (1983, 27) in which the narrator, Michelangelo, attests that 
through the mediation of a name transmission bears us and opens up life 
to us…to question its meaning: 
I have seen many dead. My father, once he returned to his race, was no more than an 
anonymous Buonarotti : he had laid down the burden of being himself; he faded in the 
humbleness of death until he was nothing but a name in a long series of men; his lineage 
did not end up in him but in myself, his successor, because the dead are nothing but the 
terms of a problem which each one of their survivors poses in turn. 
Language and name make up our very being and part of its “substance” – 
what is left of human beings if they lose their name? What is left if they lose 
their language? – yet for all that language and name also have the contingency 
and the exteriority of a “choice” which does not depend on the subject. This 
could be called destiny. 
Learning to speak, then, means acquiring the capacity to explore this 
destiny, to invest the symbolic place assigned to us at birth, to learn the rules of 
communal living and the values of our social universe. It also means learning 
“All that has become part of us now” etween mother tongue and foreign language 
 189
how to relate to others, to internalize the “laws of speech” and the categories of 
prohibition on which they are based. 
Is there a rejection of these “laws of speech” in this day and age? Could 
what we call today “postmodernity” (Dufour, 2003) be described as the decline 
of the figures of the Other? Could this decline be read in the fact that today, in 
the name of free speech and the right to be different, no jouissance (enjoyment)2 
should be forbidden?  
Freud and psychoanalysis constantly stress that prohibition structures the 
psyche (psychisme), and that there is harm caused by an education which does 
not set limits. Growing up, then, means that, from the symbolic place that is our 
lot, we must confront “attributes” and “adjectives” ascribed to us by family and 
educational discourses in order to question them and to distance ourselves from 
them, in other words to become mature and live as an adult. 
In his book The African, J.M.G. Le Clezio (2004, 7) relates this initiatory 
journey: 
Every human being results from a father and a mother. One cannot recognize them, not 
love them, even doubt them. But they are there, with their faces, attitudes, manners and 
manias, their illusions, hopes, the shape of their hands and of their toes, the colour of 
their eyes and their hair, the way they speak, their thoughts, and probably the age of their 
death; all that has been passed onto us. 
The language known as “mother” tongue takes us in and institutes us but 
it is also the cradle of our identifications and the voice of the others imprinted 
on us. H. Michaux (1998, 663) would talk about “passages”. Words and the 
speech within which they live are the “mainstay” of the identifications upon 
which is built subjectivity: words give root and consistency to the unconscious 
identifications which define us and make us who we are; “The unconscious”, 
says Lacan (1966a, 830), “is a concept forged in the wake of what is at work in 
the making of a subject.” 
Our relationship to language, therefore, is of symbolic inscription and of 
identification (Tabouret-Keller 1989, 180). It is this double relation which learners 
of a foreign language lack, whatever their motivation. This language, at least 
for a certain period of time, is radically “foreign” to them because they cannot 
find their “place” in it; they can only be counted in it by “subtraction”, doomed 
to radical solitude on the “territory of the other” and to “the enigma of arrival” 
(Naipaul, 1987). 
                                                     
2 We follow S. Zizek’s example here, keeping the French term jouissance which has no real equivalent in 
English, but giving the closest approximation of it between brakets. For a discussion of related 
psychoanalytic terms used here, i.e. prohibition, psyche/psychism, and jouissance, see www.e.notes.com/ 
sychoanalysis-encyclopedia/…      
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Undefined, indistinct and “out of lace”, learners of a foreign language 
know that in that language they are outside themselves, i.e. alienated. It is this 
alienation which confronts migrants or exiles. Thus they have to  live in-between 
trying to conjugate, associate heterogeneous modes of meaning and language; 
their ordinary experience can only be one of uncertainty, misunderstanding and 
incomprehension; they are constantly confronted with a sense of loss, loss of 
geography – even if, as Bianciotti points out, geography is only the apparent, 
superficial form of exile – estrangement from their own language and loss of 
the feeling of continuity, permanence and stability that it normally gives them. 
From the start, the other language presents itself to them as a threat 
because it exposes them to insecurity, to the breaking down of certainties and 
to a certain subjective precariousness because in it they can always lose, and be 
alienated from, their inner voice. When they speak in a foreign language, their 
first words can only be awkward: their speech is confused, it cannot open up 
freely, it is a kind of stammering because language fails them, it no longer 
provides them with a space in which to come forward and stand their ground. 
The foreign language remains foreign, i.e. outside and they feel powerless and 
frustrated because they are aware that they must submit what they mean to say 
to rules and operations they fail to understand, that they do not yet master fully. 
Now they learn to know this new language, to know its signs
3
 and their 
function of designation and communication. When they speak their mother 
tongue, it also means that they are “spoken” by it, the mother tongue expresses 
and speaks in them and in spite of them – “the words about to come out know 
something about us that we don’t know about them” (Char 1983, 534) – so they 
speak their mother tongue whereas they can only know a foreign language and 
consequently they consider it spontaneously as a means of communication. 
In the foreign language they learn to communicate, in the strictest sense 
of the word which is to transmit/receive a piece of information. It is this 
situation which makes them foreigners in the language of the host country. 
Whereas speaking a language and being spoken by it allows one’s speech to 
deploy all its powers of evocation, invention and differentiation, knowing a 
language condemns the subject to the restricted economy of message and 
information. 
Without definition, place or distinction, they can only feel that in the 
foreign language they are in representation, that they play a part in it. Their first 
words are, at least for some time, subject to a visualization fantasy, they imagine 
that their speech is being watched by others: “I feel naked when I speak 
                                                     
3 According to the opposition between sign and signifier as defined by Lacan, the sign is  “something to 
somebody”; “a signifier is what represents the subject to another signifier”, the subject being 
subordinated to the signifier and to his speech whose effects of meaning escape him.  (See Lacan 2007, 
694). 
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English, I am ashamed”. Speaking in a foreign language can foster inhibition, 
but it can also be a source of pleasure (Prieur 1987, 57) and play, pleasure “to 
be different”, to be “elsewhere”, which gives language learning its intrinsically 
theatrical dimension.  
In the foreign language, speech has an “as if”, make-believe dimension, 
it is not an exercise in responsibility, it does not really involve the subject, 
neither when facing the other nor where his/her own speech is concerned. In 
the so-called mother tongue speech is a commitment that subjects must fulfil 
and that holds them to their word; this is due to the fact that they are risking 
“their truth” in the process, i.e., according to psychoanalysis, what is at once 
most intimate and most foreign, what they will never entirely master. 
On the contrary, there is no commitment in the foreign language but the 
playful possibility of an always open exercise in irresponsibility: the possibility, 
for instance, of making light and ebullient declarations of love or promises of 
marriage: 
And it is true that I felt irresponsible in that other language, so unknown to me (...) I 
made the most amiable declarations of love to her, a habit quite foreign to my character 
and that language not only did I use it lightly but above all, because I more or less 
invented it, I expressed in it (...) unknown feelings that came out impudently in this form 
and deceived even myself... (Blanchot 1948, 100). 
The foreigner, migrant or exile dwell on the frontier of language: learning 
a foreign language they are faced with a linguistic system that is heterogeneous 
to that of their mother tongue, they come up against phonological, morpho-
syntactic and semantic frontiers they cannot guess or anticipate. First they will 
have to recognize these frontiers and then, in the best of cases, progressively 
master them. This linguistic appropriation can be, for some at least, a way 
toward subjectivation because subjects can open themselves to the language, let 
it come alive inside them through their dreams, their swearwords, their puns 
and their metaphorical use of words. 
Allow it be alive within them in order to open up the possibility of 
defining themselves, to speak as subjects in a configuration of relationships 
with others. That is to say a configuration of affects and identifications in 
which desire comes into play. Allowing language to dwell in oneself means 
risking one’s desire in it, also allowing oneself to become caught up in what 
cannot be learned – its ambiguities, its idiomatic phrases, its usual metaphors – 
but can reveal oneself to oneself. Open oneself to language and to those who 
speak it to reveal themselves in it. 
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I for Imaginary 
The imaginary is a key dimension of subjectivity, whether we call it 
“ego”, “conscience”, or managing agent of our adaptation to reality; it opens  
up our existence to the “semblant.” As far as the relation to languages is 
concerned, this dimension denotes a degree of “reflexivity” of the subject 
towards his language or languages. Whereas the common speaker does not 
generally look at his language and his relationship to it from the outside, the 
grammarian, the philosopher and obviously the writer endeavour to describe 
and analyse their “feeling for the language” and more precisely their feeling for 
the “motherness” of the language, for what makes it “maternal” for them. 
Whereas the figures of reflexivity are diverse, it seems possible to 
outline some recurring features of this “motherness”. Kafka was distressed by 
his bad asthma contracted “by dint of running after the dream of a language 
which would come from within.” (Prieur 2005, 68). Between him and German, 
– a language which he calls his “mother” tongue but which he says he does not 
like –, there is a distance, a discrepancy and he feels uneasy in this language 
that does not come from within, and in which he cannot dwell completely. He 
speaks of the impossible “familiarity”, or the impossible proximity of the 
German Jew with his language; according to him, it is “completely ridiculous 
to call a Jewish mother “Mutter”” (Kafka 1983, 99). In German he is 
confronted with the question of the “maternal” in language as well as with his 
“fantasy of language”, that is to say, in the last analysis, with the fantasy of a 
language “without exteriority” or a language which cannot fail to give its 
speaker a feeling of familiarity, of proximity and self-confidence, in other 
words a language which cannot be conceptualized without the “effect of 
identity” inherent to its very usage. 
Interiority, familiarity, proximity, self-confidence and identity – these 
are the subjective elements on which the feeling for language is based. The lack 
of exteriority or the proximity that the subject experiences in his relationship to 
his language is quite often described by means of corporal metaphors, metaphor 
of the “skin” – “the mother tongue, wrote Freud, is not a garment, it is your 
own skin” (letter to A. Zweig). The most commonly used is the metaphor of 
“breath”. Language is fitted to the mouth and to the body and the subject 
breathes within his language as well as he breathes it; thus he is not its “host”, 
he is not just “passing” through it: what moves him, rather, is “the unshakeable 
feeling of being at home” in language.  
Not only does the subject “feel at home” in language but he also 
experiences “faithfulness”, faithfulness of, and to, language. In La Conscience 
des mots, E. Canetti (1989, 204) recounts how, when he was living in London, 
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he was prone to “word crises” in English as his mother tongue, German, came 
rushing through his mind in irrepressible waves. The feeling of “being at 
home” in our language is often also the feeling of being the origin (source) of 
our speech, of being able to impose our “will to say” on language, of  being in 
control of it. This is what Kafka calls “self-confidence”. In this respect, a 
mother tongue is a language in which we always have the illusion of mastery. 
This feeling of being at home in language can also become an absolute, 
radical attachment to language, the feeling that we cannot be dissociated or 
separated from it and finally that we not only possess language but are also 
possessed by it. Language can thus be experienced as “property”, ownership of 
ourselves by ourselves within ourselves, inalienable property, property that we 
can carry with us everywhere
4
. This experience of property always opens up 
the possibility of conceiving language in terms of “ground”, “roots”, “natural 
foundation”. 
Then a different subjective logic or “economy” of “maternality” becomes 
apparent; what is at stake here is no longer only “familiarity” or “proximity” 
but “unicity”, – the mother tongue is “irreplaceable”, it is the unique matrix of 
meaning for the subject -, “origin-arity” and “natural origin-arity” of language, 
all this summed up in roots, earth, ground… Unicity, origin-arity, natur-ality: 
the maternality thus defined can always bring out the worst and lead to a form 
of “sacralization” and “idolatry” of language, and therefore paves the way to all 
kinds of ideologies of “rootedness” (enracinement) and identity. “One” 
language and not just language, “one” identity and not just identity, “one” 
origin and not just origin, that is to say the fetishism of a “tongue-mother-
nature-earth-race” and of an identity that cannot be breached. 
In other words, this maternality can easily become a regressive figure, 
not of the love of language, but of passion, the passion of the “unique 
language” and passion of “being-one” or, as Michaux (1998, 22-23) puts it, of 
the “public block-man living in society”. It is in this social passion of the 
“block-man” or “being-one” that voluntary servitude, exclusion and the murder 
of the other can eventually take root. The “block-man” only asserts himself as 
such by denying or excluding others: driven by a fantasy of omnipotence, 
oneness and mastery, he denies the other and his/her speech. He refuses the 
other’s speech inasmuch as it is the very ground of his existence as subject. He 
will not even hear about the division of the subject and the incompleteness of 
speech and he does not know that “there is as much difference betwixt us and 
ourselves as betwixt us and others.”  (Montaigne 1962, 372). 
Subjects are divided because they don’t know what they are saying. The 
meaning of Freud’s discovery is that language slips away from the subjects’ 
                                                     
4 See the discussion that J. Derrida devotes to the relationship of H. Arendt to the German language in Le 
Monolinguisme de l'autre, éd. Galilée, 1996. 
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tongue, although they must maintain this illusion which robs them of their 
integrity and makes any word for word “translation” of what constitutes them 
useless, although they keep dreaming of a language which would be adequate 
to what they are. This discovery ruins the illusion of unity which is the block-
man’s fetish. 
The words we use can open within ourselves a “line of flight”, make us 
non-identical to ourselves and also can create, by the many effects of their 
meanings, play of associations and resonances, a double meaning that exceeds 
and ruins the conscious awareness of meaning and intentions. Without knowing 
it, subjects then experience a “de-centering” and they can always evaluate, after 
the fact, the power of disorientation of the words they use. When Freud speaks 
of the unconscious and of desire he gives meaning to this otherness of speech, 
he underlines its force of subversion and dispersion. 
Why do we have conversations? Why so many exchanges of words for 
hours on end? (Michaux 1981, 58). 
If each one of us speaks, enters into this indefinite, essential, endless 
activity that conversation is, it is not only to exchange information but to learn 
from the other who we are, to try and find out what constitutes us as subject. 
Each one of us is in the image of that which speaks in him/her, in spite of 
him/her, in this fundamental speech relation, the “speech pact” with the other 
which establishes one in one’s subjectivity. It is this very speech pact that the 
social passion of being-one denies or rejects. It is in this rejection that the 
exclusion of the other originates as the following story told by M. Safouan 
(1995, 14) illustrates: 
After a victorious battle a general decides to rest with his army at the 
foot of a mountain. As he looks up he sees above him a man who is sitting on 
the mountainside. Furious and indignant, he climbs up to this man to demand 
satisfaction from him. 
How dare you sit above me? Don’t you know who I am?  
Indeed Sir, you haven’t told me.  
I am the commander of that army that you can see yonder.  
And who is your commander?  
Why, the marshal, of course.  
And above the marshal, is there anything?  
What do you mean? The King naturally.  
And above the King?  
There is nothing above the King.  
Well then, the man replied, I am that nothing. 
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